These Suns just won't stop rising

http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/5423990#

Charley Rosen / Special to FOXSports.com
Posted: 8 hours ago

The Suns are certainly one of the most fascinating teams in the NBA. Without Amare Stoudemire and Kurt Thomas, and with a small forward, Boris Diaw, playing center, Phoenix has still been able to turn virtually every ball game into a track meet.

Reversing the traditional wisdom preached and proved by NBA seers from Red Auerbach to Phil Jackson, the Suns' game plan is this: "The best defense is a good offense".

Thus far their high-octane point-making has forced most opponents to play at an incredibly accelerated pace — discomforting the bad guys, wearing them down physically and mentally, and forcing them to make decisions much faster than they want to.

On Friday, Phoenix zoomed into San Antonio looking for more of the same. And, indeed, the game was a legitimate litmus test for the Suns. Could Phoenix's frantic modus operandi overwhelm the defending champs in their own corral?

When the dust settled, the game belonged to the Spurs 108-102. Let's take a look at exactly how San Antonio derailed the Phoenix express.

THE SPURS DEFENSE

There's no doubt that 1-through-8, the Suns have the quickest, most athletic squad in the league. Obviously, they want to run on every possession, even when the Spurs scored and Phoenix was forced to take the ball out of the net. Four of the Suns' starters — Steve Nash, Shawn Marion, Boris Diaw, and Raja Bell — can swiftly move the ball into the attack zone. Only Jumaine Jones has a faulty handle on the run (he had one assist, 3 turnovers, and 3 points). Of their subs, Eddie House and Leandro Barbosa are also trustworthy trigger-men, and the newly recruited Tim Thomas can effectively put the ball on the floor only when he's creating his own scoring opportunities. The math reveals that six of the eight Suns who took the court in San Antonio are capable of leading a devastating fast break.

Compare this quotient with the nine Spurs who saw daylight: Tim Duncan, Bruce Bowen, Nazr Mohammed, Robert Horry, Michael Finley, and Brent Barry are strictly half-court players. Beno Udrih has improved as a shooter, but still has a shaky handle when pressured. That leaves Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili to conduct any fast-break opportunities.


It was obviously nonsensical for the Spurs to try to out-run the Suns. Indeed, among Gregg Popovich's pre-game instructions was an insistence that his team walk the ball across the time-line even if they had Phoenix temporarily out-numbered. This last restriction was exercised only once when, late in the fourth quarter, the Spurs had a 4-on-3 advantage and Parker sat on the ball until they could get into a half-court set. Little wonder that one of the statistical categories dominated by the Suns was fast-break points wherein they outscored the Spurs 18-0.

By slowing down the game, the Spurs forced Phoenix to play a half-court game. The Suns were not exactly slouches when the air is taken out of the ball and they have several strategies at their command.

With no true center on the court at any time, the Suns kept the middle unoccupied. This also spread out the Spurs defense and meant that whenever Phoenix ran a foul-line-level screen/roll, the defensive helpers had too much ground to cover to be of much help. This advantage was exacerbated by the sheer speed and tricky moves of each and every Phoenix player. All game long, the Spurs defense never effectively stymied this tactic.

The Suns also changed up by running screen/fades for Thomas and Marion, a strategy which yielded undefended perimeter shots.

In spreading the defense, the Suns also created space and time for the likes of Nash, Marion, Diaw, Barbosa, House, and Thomas to be successful in iso situations. Layups were followed by layups. Even the usually reliable defensive prowess of Bowen was helpless against the Suns jet-footed penetrators (particularly Barbosa). When the Spurs tried to sag into the middle, the ball was whipped to open perimeter shooters. That's why Diaw had 7 assists, Nash had 6, Barbosa and Bell had 3 each. And that's why Phoenix shot 51.2% from the field — including 7-16 from long-distance.

Occasionally, Diaw was stationed at the high post while his teammates cut, slashed, and ran amok. This was another effective half-court tactic that the Spurs never really could contain.

When their half-court sets failed to generate any advantage, Nash simply yo-yo'd the ball, darting hither, thither and yon, driving into the bosom of the defense for tricky pull-ups, flips, and layups. And also finding open teammates whenever the Spurs concentration lapsed and they failed to plug the passing lanes.

With the ball positioned on the right wing, House and Bell came up from the strong-side baseline and received topside handoffs that left them (in the absence of any defensive help) with incredibly good looks.

In every situation, whether operating on the run or with a dead ball, every Phoenix player always made the extra pass. Always.

Mike D'Antoni sent only two players into the low post. Marion, who was bothered by Udrih's quick double-team and missed a complicated layup. And Diaw, who drew a foul, and later committed a charge. The lesson is that Phoenix gained very little whenever they tried using size and power instead of speed.

This lesson was not lost on Popovich. Therefore, in the second half the Spurs countered the Suns various S/Rs by switching. This left a big man (Duncan, Horry, or Mohammed) on Nash or Barbosa, and a small man (Parker, Udrih, or Ginobili) on Marion or Diaw. At first glance, these switcheroos created considerable advantages for the Suns. Not so. What happened was that Phoenix became so intent on trumping these mismatches that the flow of their half-court offense was fatally disrupted. Sure, Nash took all of the Spurs bigs to the hoop for nifty high-light layups (he was 13-22 for 30 points), but his teammates were transformed into spectators. This was the defensive strategy that helped turned the game � and was the same one used by San Antonio in beating Phoenix four games to two in last year's conference finals.

THE SPURS' OFFENSE

Since the Suns play defense like sprinters nervously crouched in the starting blocks, the Spurs wanted to work the ball carefully and take advantage of the visitors' anxiety. Hey, hurry up and score so we can score! Phoenix showed absolutely no interest in buckling down and playing in-your-face defense.

The main thrust of the Suns defense was limited to collapsing on ball penetration and leaning into passing lanes. Both Parker (6-11, 13 points) and Finley (5-9, 13 points) were on the shooting end of inside-out passes, and had time to count the house before firing away. When the Spurs spread the floor (touch�!), the Suns had no answer for Ginobili's one-on-one forays (4-9, 5 assists, 14 points).

A specific point of attack was the low-post where either 6-8 Diaw or 6-10 Thomas (both of them notoriously lightweight defenders) was guarding 7-0 Duncan. Both tried fronting TD several times, but since there was no weak-side help whatsoever, lob passes led to just as many layups. Two-timing Duncan was only partially successful. He did turn the ball over thrice, but also managed to pass to open shooters to the tune of 7 assists. On one possession, Duncan was actually quadruple-teamed — and was whistled for taking an extra step.

Pop even called Mohammed's number several times, and he responded with a stat-sheet filled with jump hooks, turn-around jumpers, and a dunker or two. All told Mohammed, who's usually relegated to rebounding and defending, wound up with 13-21 from the field and 30 points.

It was Mohammed who also enabled San Antonio to take fullest advantage of the size differential. He collected 16 total rebounds, which included 8 off the offensive glass. On several possessions, Duncan and Mohammed played volleyball here — sharing three, and then four, offensive rebounds in succession — until the ball was ultimately dropped through the ring.

Numbers are always tricky, and never more so than in this game. The Suns had better accuracy from the field (51.2% to the Spurs 48.9%), from beyond the arc (7-16 to 6-20), and from the stripe (68.4% to 63.2%). Phoenix likewise registered more assists (28 to 21), steals (6 to 4), blocked shots (6 to 2), along with fewer turnovers (10 to 16) and few fouls (16 to 21).

But the one stat that demonstrated the biggest area of the Spurs domination was rebounding — both total (57 to 29) and offensive retrievals (26 to 6). This last number resulted in the Spurs taking 12 more shots (92-80) and tallying four more field goals (45-41). And that's how and why the Spurs triumphed.

What can the Suns do to rectify this critical imbalance when and if the two teams meet again in the playoffs? Nothing, because it's all about genetics. Sometimes speed kills. Sometimes it commits suicide.

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